By Lorenzo Sacconi, Margaret Blair, R. Edward Freeman, A. Vercelli
Company social accountability is obvious during this booklet as multi-stakeholder method of company governance. This volume outlines neo-institutional and stakeholder theories of the enterprise, new rational selection and social agreement normative versions, self regulatory and tender legislation versions, and the advances from behavioral economics.
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Additional resources for Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance: The Contribution of Economic Theory and Related Disciplines
4 Upon naming the transaction as the basic unit of analysis, the critical attributes of transactions (for governance structure purposes) are: (1) the condition of asset specificity, in that such assets cannot be redeployed to alternative uses and users without loss of productive value; (2) the disturbances (uncertainty) to which contracts are subject; and (3) the frequency with which transactions recur. Differential contractual hazards are traced principally to the value of continuity, which vary directly with asset specificity, in conjunction with disturbances to which cooperative adaptations are needed.
Thus all of the stakeholders of a well-defined and nearly self-contained domain of social interaction are allowed to agree on a small-scale social contract in order to establish social norms regulating their interaction in the relevant domain. Before such agreement can be translated into mandatory laws by a political decision (which is not necessary in general), these norms must prove able to generate a social institution (Aoki 2001): that is, a regularity of behavior within a given domain of interaction which is reflected in the mental (normative and descriptive) model commonly shared by all the participants in the domain; Which in its turn induces a set of mutual beliefs on the behavior adopted by all of the participants so that they make decisions that replicate the same regularity of behavior.
759–78. Gauthier, D. (1969) Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Gintis, H. and R. J. Zak (ed), Moral Markets. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Gneezy, U. A. Rustichini (2000) ‘Pay Enough or Don’t Pay at All’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 115(2), pp. 791–810. Grossman, S. and O. Hart (1986) ‘The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration’, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 94, pp. 691–719. Hansmann, H. (1996) The Ownership of Enterprise.
Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Governance: The Contribution of Economic Theory and Related Disciplines by Lorenzo Sacconi, Margaret Blair, R. Edward Freeman, A. Vercelli